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Abstract
Network processing elements in virtual machines, also
known as Network Function Virtualization (NFV) often
face CPU bottlenecks at the virtualization interface. Even
highly optimized paravirtual device interfaces fall short of
the throughput requirements of modern devices. Passthrough
devices, together with SR-IOV support for multiple device
virtual functions (VF) and IOMMU support, mitigate this
problem somewhat, by allowing a VM to directly control a
device partition bypassing the virtualization stack. However,
device passthrough is riddled with its own problems of low
consolidation ratios, relatively static resource partitioning,
and difficulties in VM migration.
We present a paravirtual interface that securely exposes
an I/O device directly to the guest OS running inside the
VM, and yet allows that device to be securely shared among
multiple VMs and the host. Compared to the best-known
paravirtualization interfaces, our paravirtual interface sup-
ports up to 2x higher throughput, and is closer in perfor-
mance to device passthrough. Unlike device passthrough
however, we do not require SR-IOV or IOMMU support,
and allow fine-grained dynamic resource allocation, signifi-
cantly higher consolidation ratios, and seamless VM migra-
tion. Our security mechanism is based on a novel approach
called dynamic binary opcode subtraction.
1. Introduction
Today’s networks rely on “middleboxes” [14, 29] (also
called network appliances) for a variety of network pro-
cessing needs, such as overlay network switches, firewalls,
load balancers, routers, etc. Network function virtualization
(NFV) proposes shifting middlebox processing from spe-
cialized hardware appliances to software running on com-
modity hardware. Further, NFV benefits significantly from
virtualization capabilities, to significantly improve resource
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utilization [9], and allow sharing of hardware resources
among multiple (and potentially untrusted) tenants [9, 20].
Virtualized network appliances, however present a new
set of performance challenges. For example, ClickOS [20]
showed that the network stack on the Xen hypervisor [2]
falls far short of the maximum achievable throughput on a
10Gbps NIC, using commodity x86 hardware. Because the
original network stacks were not designed for such high-
throughput workloads, inefficiencies lurk at multiple lev-
els in current network stacks: (a) guest-side and host-side
user/kernel network API (e.g., socket API) was not designed
to handle such workloads; (b) the device virtualization in-
terface between the guest and the host (e.g., virtio [19]) is
often a performance bottleneck; and (c) the host-side net-
work bridge/switch (e.g., Linux bridge, Open vSwitch [23])
is usually incapable of handling high rates of traffic.
The netmap framework [25] proposes an efficient user/kernel
interface, best suited for high-throughput I/O. A netmap-
capable user process maps shared-memory producer-consumer
rings to communicate efficiently with the kernel. This al-
lows a zero-copy interface between the user and the kernel,
and also allows the user to perform I/O in batches, thus
amortizing the cost of traversing the kernel’s network stack
over multiple packets. This results in high overall through-
puts. For example, netmap’s pkt-gen [25] can saturate a
10Gbps link with a single 3GHz core using 64B packets
(14.88 Mpps), while the socket-based network stack reaches
only about a third of the maximum achievable throughput
[25].
However, if netmap is used inside a VM, performance
bottlenecks emerge at the device virtualization interface.
Software-emulated devices exhibit significant CPU over-
heads related to faithful execution of the device state ma-
chine in software. Paravirtual interfaces for device virtual-
ization are relatively faster, but even they prove inadequate in
such high-throughput settings. Table 1a shows the through-
put of running netmap’s pkt-gen inside a virtual machine
using the virtio-based paravirtual device [19]. The virtio
interface involves shared-memory communication between
the guest and the host through producer-consumer rings. The
table shows results for three different implementations of the
host-side networking stack, namely tap, tap-vhost, and
netmap (more details in Section 5). Compared to bare-
metal, the performance penalty of the virtio interface is
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tx(Kpps) rx(Kpps)
60B 1500B 60B 1500B
socket-baremetal 470 180 394 214
socket-virtio-vhost 250 170 300 150
netmap-baremetal 14810 820 13304 820
netmap-virtio 236 193 306 268
netmap-virtio-vhost 357 285 416 422
netmap-virtio-netmap 154 154 - -
netmap-fastio 14704 815 13292 816
netmap-fastio-no-rzc - - 12970 813
(a)
tx(Kpps) rx(Kpps)
60B 1500B 60B 1500B
netmap-baremetal 14600 822 13620 820
netmap-virtio 188 182 35 20
netmap-virtio-vhost 331 256 68 41
netmap-fastio 14632 815 13001 816
netmap-fastio-no-rzc - - 13049 811
(b)
Table 1: Single-guest throughput on (a) multiprocessor and
(b) uniprocessor hosts with a 10Gbps NIC. All numbers
are given in Kpps (thousand packets per second). To cal-
culate throughput, use Mbps = Kpps * (pktsize + 20.2)
* 8. netmap-fastio-no-rzc refers to fastio without
receive-side zero-copy
significant. The penalty is even more pronounced in CPU-
constrained settings. To show this, we also show experi-
ments with uniprocessor hosts using the virtio inter-
face. While guest-host communication involves cacheline
transfers in multiprocessor hosts, uniprocessor hosts require
expensive VM exits. Further, sharing the network device
among multiple VMs incurs performance penalties at the
host-side switch.
These CPU bottlenecks indicate that our I/O virtualiza-
tion stacks are perhaps a bit too “deep”. The cost of travers-
ing the I/O virtualization stack (even with paravirtualiza-
tion) is often more than the cost of actual network process-
ing. This I/O virtualization cost stems primarily from the
need to secure the host and the device from untrusted VMs,
which forces us to use narrow interfaces between the VM
and the host (such as producer-consumer rings) resulting in
relatively deep I/O stacks.
In this paper, we show that security can be provided in
alternate ways; we use this observation to make the I/O
stack significantly thinner. We allow a VM to have direct
visibility into the hardware device. The VM can read/write
to the hardware device without host intervention. Yet, we
ensure that an untrusted VM cannot harm the host and/or
other guests.
One of the central ideas in this paper is dynamic binary
opcode subtraction, or DBOS. DBOS enables the hyper-
visor to restrict VM behaviour; we use DBOS to imple-
ment the requisite security required in the I/O virtualization
stack. Table 1a shows results using our approach (labeled
netmap-fastio) to paravirtualization. Using fastio,
the I/O throughput achievable inside the VM is comparable
to bare-metal performance, even on a single processor. We
achieve this for an off-the-shelf guest OS (Linux), without
assumptions about SR-IOV and IOMMU hardware support.
Our interface supports fair allocation of device resources
among untrusted VMs, and allows fast switching among
them. Compared to netmap-based VALE [26], our software
switch provides up to 10x higher throughput.
In summary, this paper makes two primary contributions:
• We present a fast device paravirtualization mechanism
which exhibits close to bare-metal performance. Com-
pared to conventional paravirtualization (e.g., virtio),
our scheme provides up to 25x higher throughput. Com-
pared to highly hand-optimized I/O virtualization stacks
(e.g., ClickOS [20]), we achieve around 2x throughput
improvement for small 60B packets, and around 30%
throughput improvement for 1500B packets.
• We introduce a novel security mechanism, DBOS, which
allows a hypervisor to restrict guest behaviour. We demon-
strate an application of DBOS to improve I/O virtualiza-
tion performance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
relevant background on network processing and switching;
we discuss our DBOS-based solution alongwith its security
considerations in Section 3. The operation of our guest-
side paravirtual driver is presented in Section 4, Section 5
presents our experiments and results; Section 6 discusses
design considerations and alternate design choices; Section 7
discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
Previous work [25] has shown that the traditional user/kernel
interface for network processing can become a performance
bottleneck for high-throughput workloads. The netmap API
defines a user/kernel interface, whereby a user process can
pre-allocate a set of ring buffers to communicate with the
kernel, and map this allocated memory in its address space.
The interface between the user and the kernel is that of
a shared ring containing buffer pointers. On the transmit
path, the user can write the packet contents in pre-allocated
buffers, setup the buffer pointers in the shared ring, and in-
crement the ring’s head pointer. The kernel would consume
buffers from the shared ring by incrementing the tail pointer,
and send them to the network port/device. Similarly, on the
receive path, the user would first set up empty buffers in its
ring and update the head pointer; the kernel would copy re-
ceived packets to the ring buffers, and increment the ring’s
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tail pointer (so the user can read the packet contents). Un-
like traditional socket API, netmap does not involve over-
heads related to memory allocation/deallocation, copying,
and other book-keeping on the I/O datapath. The overall re-
sult is a much faster user/kernel API. As we see in Table 1a,
the netmap API can saturate a 10Gbps NIC (14.8 Mpps),
while the traditional socket API can only reach a fraction of
the link capacity for 60B packets on baremetal.
Running the network processing elements inside a virtual
machine require device virtualization. Unlike full virtual-
ization, paravirtualization allows flexibility in choosing the
right VM/hypervisor interface for optimum performance.
Today, device paravirtualization is typically done using a
shared-memory producer-consumer ring between the guest
and the host. For example, KVM/Virtio sets up shared-
memory rings between the guest and the Qemu process.
On the transmit path, the guest writes to the shared ring and
the host-side Qemu process reads from it. Similarly, data
flows in the reverse direction on the receive path. As an op-
timization, the host-side kernel may read/write to the queue
(virtio-vhost) instead of the Qemu process.
A host-side software switch (e.g., Linux tun/tap, Open
vSwitch), typically implemented as a part of the kernel mul-
tiplexes/demultiplexes packets for multiple guests. Current
switches are unable to sustain high throughputs; e.g., the
tap interface on Linux and Open vSwitch peak at around
300-600Kpps [20, 26]. A recent software-switch, VALE,
takes advantage of the fact that its ports may be using the
netmap API. Using this, VALE implements switching in
batches, thus exposing opportunities for improving forward-
ing performance, and optimizing cache utilization through
prefetching. Even with these optimizations, a VALE switch
together with the virtio-vhost interface, can handle only up
to 3.5Mpps [26].
Due to these limitations, a common approach today
for high-performance networking with virtual machines, is
device-passthrough, whereby a NIC can be exposed directly
to a VM. Device passthrough reduces scalability, as the de-
vice is exclusively controlled by the given virtual machine.
This problem is mitigated by modern NICs supporting hard-
ware multi-queuing, VMDq, and SR-IOV [15]. Further, de-
vice passthrough complicates live migration, and requires
IOMMU support for security.
We show that it is possible to achieve equivalent perfor-
mance as device-passthrough without compromising scala-
bility, or live-migration. We also do not require SR-IOV or
IOMMU hardware support.
3. Our Solution
Our paravirtual device driver, called fastio driver, is dif-
ferent from current paravirtual drivers (e.g., virtio) in several
ways. Firstly, we require that our device driver should au-
thenticate itself with the hypervisor at load-time. Once au-
thenticated, the hypervisor can trust the fastio driver with
privileged device state. The authentication and trust is main-
tained in multiple steps:
1. Our fastio driver does not rely on any read/write static
data, i.e., its binary object file contains only code pages
and read-only static data. For all other memory needs, the
driver must use “special” stack space or heap memory.
As we see later, the hypervisor ensures that this stack and
heap memory remain private to our driver, i.e., the rest of
the guest kernel cannot read/write to it.
2. At load time, the fastio driver loads its code and read-
only data pages in the guest memory, and informs the
hypervisor about its loaded addresses and size, using a
hypercall.
3. Using page-protection bits in the x86 extended page ta-
bles (EPTs) [17], the hypervisor write-protects all code
and data pages of the fastio driver. This allows the hyper-
visor to ensure that the guest OS cannot change the driver
code/data, after it has been loaded and authenticated.
4. The hypervisor verifies the contents of the driver’s code
pages. We perform this verification using cryptography-
based digital-signatures. The fastio driver presents a
signed certificate (signed by the hypervisor) which certi-
fies the contents of the code pages; the hypervisor com-
putes a sha1 hash of the code pages, and ensure that it
matches with the value presented in the signed certifi-
cate.
Next, we expose the privileged device state to the guest,
by mapping its memory addresses (including MMIO ad-
dresses) in the guest’s physical address space (GPA space).
This involves creating mappings in the guest’s EPT for the
device data structures at “privileged GPA addresses”, or PG-
PAs. We need to ensure that the PGPAs are distinct from the
actual guest physical memory addresses, to avoid conflicts.
In our prototype implementation, we use addresses above
4GB for PGPAs; we assume that all our guests have less
than 4GB RAM. This is not a fundamental restriction, as PG-
PAs can be chosen to be arbitrarily large in a 64-bit address
space. Mapping privileged state at PGPAs, exposes the hy-
pervisor to attacks from the untrusted guest. To prevent these
attacks, we next ensure that the PGPAs cannot be mapped in
the guest’s virtual address space, unless the hypervisor ex-
plicitly allows it to do so. Essentially, we will try to ensure
that the fastio driver is allowed to map the PGPAs in its ad-
dress space, while the rest of the guest kernel is not allowed
to do so.
If the hypervisor can successfully ensure that the PGPAs
are not mapped in the guest’s virtual address space (GVA
space), it effectively ensures that the guest cannot access
the PGPA addresses. We configure the virtualization hard-
ware to ensure that a VM exit occurs on every change to
the guest’s virtual address space. i.e., an exit should occur
on every execution of the mov-to-cr3, mov-to-cr4,
mov-to-cr0, and other privileged instruction that can po-
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tentially change the VA space. On VM exits resulting from
these instructions, the hypervisor checks the new GVA space
to ensure that no mappings exist to our PGPAs in it. For ex-
ample, on the execution of a mov-to-cr3 instruction in-
side the guest, a VM exit occurs, and the hypervisor walks
the page table to ensure that none of its entries point to the
PGPAs.
Because x86 paging allows changes to the VA space
through simple modifications to the page-table entries, we
further mark all the page-table pages read-only on every cr3
load. Thus, while walking the guest’s page table during the
VM-exit caused by the mov-to-cr3 instruction, the hy-
pervisor marks all the GPAs corresponding to the page-table
pages as read-only. Any future write access by the guest to
its page-table pages, causes an EPT violation, resulting in a
VM exit. The hypervisor then emulates the exiting instruc-
tion within the hypervisor before returning control back to
the VM.
Using this, we ensure that the guest can never directly
access the PGPA space. This solution requires VM exits on
every execution of the mov-to-cr3 instruction (among
other such instructions that can change the address space)
and on every write access to a page-table page within the
guest. Now, the hypervisor needs to implement a mechanism
which allows our fastio driver to access the PGPA space
directly (but still disallows the rest of the guest kernel from
doing so).
The hypervisor sets up a special page-table, called the
privileged page table PPT, using pages in the read-only data
section of the fastio driver. Notice that the hypervisor is free
to write to the PPT, even though the PPT pages appear read-
only to the guest kernel. The PPT will contain mappings to
the PGPA space, and the fastio driver can switch to it using
the mov-to-cr3 instruction to access the device state di-
rectly. The PPT would also contain mappings for the guest’s
kernel data structures, so that the driver can efficiently com-
municate between the device and the guest kernel. In our
32-bit implementation, our PPT maps the entire guest kernel
in the PPT (at addresses above 0xc0000000), and uses the
“userspace addresses” (0x0000000-0xc0000000) to map the
privileged device state.
The fastio driver’s pseudo-code is shown in Figure 1. The
driver first disables interrupts (line 2), then loads the address
of the PPT in %eax register (line 3), and finally, executes
mov-to-cr3 to load the PPT (line 5). (We discuss the need
for save/restore of the stack pointer later). The body of the
fastio driver can now access the device and the guest’s data
structures to efficiently implement the transmit/receive logic.
In particular, it transfers packets between the guest’s netmap
ring and the device’s hardware ring. Finally, after the body of
the fastio driver has executed, the mov-to-cr3 instruction
is executed to restore the guest’s original page table (line
13), before restoring the original interrupt flag and returning
to the caller. (We discuss the need for lines 14-15 later).
fastio_driver() {
1 save_flags() # save flags
2 cli # clear interrupts
3 movl $ppt, %eax # eax <- PPT addr
4 tmp = read_cr3() # save old cr3 value
5 movl %eax, %cr3 # load new page table
6 save_sp() # save stack pointer
7 movl $pstk, %esp # use priv stack
8
9 fastio_body() # calls txsync/rxsync
10
11 restore_sp() # restore old stackptr
12 movl tmp, %eax # eax <- old cr3 value
13 movl %eax, %cr3 # load old page table
14 if (%eax == $ppt)
15 vmcall # alert the hypervisor
16 restore_flags() # re-enable interrupts
17 ret # return to caller
}
Figure 1: Fastio driver pseudo-code
Apart from security considerations, this solution has a
serious performance concern. Every call to the fastio driver
involves two executions of the mov-to-cr3 instruction,
and each of them will cause a VM exit in our model. The
performance overhead of these exits is likely to be more than
the overhead of the virtio interface, which only required
one exit (or no exits for multiprocessor hosts). Ideally, we
would like to ensure that the two mov-to-cr3 instructions
executed by our fastio driver do not cause VM exits, while
the other mov-to-cr3 instructions executed by the guest
kernel cause VM exits.
This differentiation is perhaps hard to achieve efficiently,
through runtime mechanisms alone. We use dynamic binary
opcode subtraction (DBOS) to solve this problem. DBOS in-
volves ensuring that an opcode is not present in the guest’s
executable address space. To implement DBOS, the hypervi-
sor removes execute-privileges from all guest pages, except
the fastio driver’s code pages. This is done at the time when
the fastio driver is loaded, and the hypervisor verifies it. Sub-
sequently, any instruction execution by the guest OS (outside
of the fastio driver) would cause a VM exit resulting from an
EPT execute-privileges violation. At this point, the hypervi-
sor scans the page containing the instruction being executed
to ascertain the absence of the mov-to-cr3 opcode in that
page. Checking the absence of the mov-to-cr3 opcode in-
volves checking the absence of the following byte sequence
in the page: 0x0f, 0x20, “B”. Here B is any byte that satis-
fies the equation: (B&0x38 == 0x18), i.e., the bits 3, 4, and
5 of B should be equal to 0b011 (cr3). The prime observa-
tion is that if a byte sequence corresponding to an opcode is
not even present in the executable address space of a guest,
the guest can never execute that opcode. In the rest of the
paper, we will also call this sequence of bytes representing
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the mov-to-cr3 opcode, the 2.5-byte sequence (two exact
bytes, and one byte with three bits set to a certain value).
We noticed that it is quite rare to find the presence of
the 2.5-byte sequence in typical code. For example, the only
code pages in the Linux kernel that contain this 2.5-byte se-
quence are the mov-to-cr3 instructions themselves. No-
tice that while ascertaining the absence of a byte sequence,
we disregard any assumptions about instruction boundaries.
We call this technique “dynamic binary opcode subtraction”,
because it subtracts an opcode dynamically from the execu-
tion stream of a guest.
The mov-to-cr3 opcode needs to be subtracted not
just from the guest kernel’s code stream, but also from the
user programs’ execution stream running within the guest.
If we disregard user programs, the guest can launch a simple
attack, whereby it can branch to a user code page with kernel
privileges to execute the mov-to-cr3 instruction. Even in
the user code pages, the presence of the 2.5-byte sequence
is extremely rare. In fact, in all our experiments involving
execution of several programs shipped with stock Ubuntu
Linux, including the SPEC Integer programs, we did not find
the presence of the 2.5-byte sequence in any of them.
If a page containing the current executing instruction (and
causing the EPT violation) does not contain the 2.5-byte
sequence, we restore executable privileges on it. To guard
against attacks involving page-boundaries, we also check the
successor and predecessor pages of the currently executing
page. If either of them has already been marked executable,
we ensure that the 2.5-byte sequence does not appear even if
the two pages are consider together as one contiguous block.
Similarly, each time an executable page is installed in a page
table (through a page table update, hence causing a VM
exit), we perform the same check again to ensure that the
executable page’s new neighbours do not cause the presence
of the 2.5-byte sequence.
When we mark a page with execute privileges, we also
take away write privileges from that page (again through ma-
nipulation of page-protection bits in the corresponding EPT
entry). If that page is ever written-to subsequently (to imple-
ment page-swapping, for example), an EPT violation occurs
— in this case, the hypervisor removes execute privileges
from that page, and re-instates write privileges on that page.
This mechanism can also handle dynamically generated and
self-modifying code.
This scheme works well if none of the guest pages con-
tain the 2.5-byte sequence. However, if a page (or a combina-
tion of two successive pages in the GVA space) indeed con-
tains the 2.5-byte sequence, the hypervisor needs to handle
it gracefully. A straw-man solution is to never grant execute
privileges to any such page, causing an EPT violation each
time an instruction on that page gets executed. This is likely
to result in a huge slowdown, especially if multiple instruc-
tions within a page execute a large number of times (e.g., a
loop). We instead use in-place binary patching to deal with
such situations efficiently.
We patch any instruction containing the 2.5-byte se-
quence, with the single-byte int3 opcode (0xcc), resulting
in a VM exit on its execution. (We configure the virtualiza-
tion hardware to generate a VM exit on the int3 instruc-
tion). The hypervisor keeps track of all such patches, and
emulates the original instruction on the patch-induced VM
exits. The use of the int3 instruction does not preclude the
guest from using it for its own purposes (e.g., debugging),
as the hypervisor can easily differentiate between guest’s
int3 and hypervisor’s patched int3. The only remaining
complication is that of identifying the instruction boundary
containing the 2.5-byte sequence. As we discussed earlier, in
all our experiments, the only occurrence of the 2.5-byte se-
quence involved an actual mov-to-cr3 instruction within
the guest. Hence, simply patching all the 3 bytes in the se-
quence would achieve the desired result. If we patch all the
3 bytes, we also take care of cases, where the 2.5-byte se-
quence straddles two instructions, i.e., some of the bytes be-
long to one instruction, while others belong to the successor
instruction.
In general, it is possible that the 2.5-byte sequence ap-
pears in the middle of an instruction. In this case, if we
simply patch the sequence, the guest’s instruction semantics
can change (causing the guest to get incorrectly confused).
Here is an example of an instruction that could get incor-
rectly patched:
assembly binary representation
mov $0x18200f, %eax 0xb8, 0x0f, 0x20, 0x18, 0x0
This instruction contains the 2.5-byte sequence, and if we
patched it with the int3 opcode, we would replace it with
assembly binary representation
mov $0xcccccc, %eax 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0x0
Hence, this instruction would silently behave incorrectly
(without causing a VM exit) if patched by us. To deal with
this situation, we need to identify the instruction boundary of
the instruction containing the 2.5-byte sequence, and patch
its first byte (along with patching the 2.5 bytes sequence it-
self). In this example, we should have also replaced the first
byte 0xb8 with 0xcc. Doing so would ensure that a VM
exit occurs on the execution of this instruction, allowing the
hypervisor to emulate it correctly.
Our current method for identifying instruction boundaries
involves tracking the values of eip for each process/kernel
(identified using the value of the cr3 register). On notic-
ing a 2.5-byte sequence, we start disassembling instructions
from a known predecessor eip in the current GVA space.
Using this disassembly, we can identify the boundary of the
instruction containing the 2.5-byte sequence. If a predeces-
sor eip is not known yet, we simply leave the page without
execute privileges, and emulate the instructions in the hyper-
visor if that page executes again, in the hope that eventually
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we will find some predecessor eip to the 2.5-byte sequence.
If we still do not find a predecessor eip after a large num-
ber of EPT-induced VM exits on that page, we simply patch
the 2.5-byte sequence with the int3 opcodes. We had to
do this for one page during our experiments on the Linux
kernel, where we found a mov-to-cr3 instruction in the
first page of the 32-bit Linux kernel image (v3.9.0). None
of the instructions preceding this instruction (including this
instruction) ever executed after loading the driver, and so we
could not reliably determine the instruction boundary. In this
particular case, patching the 2.5-byte sequence was anyways
the correct thing to do. Notice that mis-identification (or
non-identification) of instruction boundaries does not pose a
security risk; it can only cause misbehaviour within a guest.
If a guest is aware of our approach, it can easily help the
VMM by avoiding such situations.
Using DBOS, we configure the virtualization hardware to
not cause VM exits on execution of the mov-to-cr3 in-
struction inside the guest; yet we ensure that the mov-to-cr3
instruction causes a VM exit inside the guest kernel, but does
not cause an exit within our fastio driver. This enables us to
have an exitless I/O path between guest-fastio-guest, and
yet provide direct visibility into the hardware device state
to fastio. This enables us to obtain I/O performance close
to bare-metal, within the guest. The fastio driver can now
be used, not just to access the hardware device, but also to
access other privileged state of the host/other VMs, and to
implement fast VM-to-VM and VM-to-host communication.
We next discuss the security threats to our scheme, and
our solutions to them.
3.1 Security
Our security model relies on the inability of the guest to
change its virtual address space without hypervisor interven-
tion. We achieve this by ensuring that the guest’s executable
address space cannot contain the mov-to-cr3 opcode. We
configure the virtualization hardware such that all guest in-
structions that can potentially modify its address space cause
VM exits, with the exception of the mov-to-cr3 instruc-
tion. The mov-to-cr3 instruction does not cause a VM
exit; instead we use DBOS and binary patching to ensure
that the guest exits on mov-to-cr3 executions. The fas-
tio driver’s mov-to-cr3 instructions execute without VM
exits. We further need to ensure that the fastio driver’s code
does not itself contain the 2.5-byte sequence, except at entry
and exit (for the mov-to-cr3 instructions as shown in Fig-
ure 1). These two instructions at fastio entry/exit points are
the only occurrences of the 2.5-byte sequence in the guest’s
executable address space.
The body of the fastio driver is our “trusted comput-
ing base” (TCB), as it enjoys visibility into privileged state
through the PPT. As discussed earlier, we ensure that the
TCB cannot be modified through EPT page-protection bits.
Further, we ensure that all execution within the TCB hap-
pens with interrupts disabled (notice the cli instruction at
fastio entry), so that no other code can run while the PPT
is operational. We also need to ensure that the fastio code
is bug-free and cannot cause any exception, lest the guest’s
untrusted exception handler may get called while the PPT
is operational. We also ensure that all non-maskable inter-
rupts cause VM exits, so that the hypervisor can interpose
and disallow the guest from running while the PPT is opera-
tional. Further, the TCB uses a separate CPU-private stack to
disallow another processor from trying to interfere with our
execution by causing race conditions on our stack state (lines
6,7,11 in Figure 1). The CPU-private stack is also mapped in
the PPT and the PGPA space, to protect it from the rest of the
guest kernel. Further, we ensure that the pages belonging to
the fastio driver are mapped correctly in the guest page table
(if mapped), and only in one place at its designated virtual
address.
We ensure that the only mov-to-cr3 opcodes in the
guest’s executable address space are the ones belonging to
the fastio driver at entry and exit. The guest could poten-
tially launch an attack, by directly jumping to one of these
two mov-to-cr3 instructions inside the fastio driver, to
subvert our protection. We discuss three potential attack sce-
narios, and how we neutralize them.
Jumping to one of fastio’s mov-to-cr3 instruction
with an arbitrary value in the eax register
The guest could load a pointer to an arbitrary page table
structure in the eax register and jump directly to one of
the mov-to-cr3 instructions in the fastio driver. This can
cause an arbitrary page table to get loaded within the guest.
This new page table could contain mappings to the PGPA
pages; further, the new page table may map the virtual ad-
dress corresponding to the EIP register to a totally differ-
ent GPA, thus allowing execution of arbitrary code while the
PGPA pages are mapped.
Fortunately, this attack can be prevented by using a
feature in x86 virtualization hardware, called “CR3 target
controls”. Using this, it is possible to configure the hard-
ware such that VM exits occur on each execution of the
mov-to-cr3 instruction, except when the value being
loaded into the cr3 register is one of the values specified
in CR3 target controls. The x86 hardware supports specifi-
cation of up to four target controls, and this capability was
perhaps included for efficient shadow-page-table based vir-
tualization.
We use this interesting capability in the following way:
we configure the hardware to exit whenever the guest exe-
cutes the mov-to-cr3 opcode, except when the value be-
ing loaded in the cr3 register is the PPT address. We do so
by specifying the PPT address as one of the CR3 target con-
trols. We use the other three CR3 target controls as a cache
for recently seen values of the cr3 register at the time of the
call to the fastio driver.
Assuming that there are a small number of processes
(typically one) accessing the fastio driver, the cr3 values
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for these processes would get cached in the CR3 target
controls. Hence, VM exits would be avoided at fastio entry
(because the loaded CR3 value is the PPT address which is
one of the CR3 target controls) and at fastio exit (because
the loaded CR3 value would typically be one of the cached
values in the CR3 target controls). In all our experiments
involving netmap, there was only one value of cr3 observed
at fastio entry, which was easily cached using the CR3 target
controls, resulting in exitless guest-fastio-guest path.
Now, the original attack, whereby the guest can jump
to fastio’s mov-to-cr3 instruction with an arbitrary value in
eax, is thwarted because the value in the eax register is not
going to be one of the CR3 target controls. Hence, a VM exit
would occur and the hypervisor can interpose and prevent
the attack.
Further, the guest may try to set its eax register to one of
the cached target controls, and then branch to fastio’s mov-
to-cr3, thus avoiding the VM exit. The only security threat
from this behaviour could occur if the guest uses the PPT’s
address in the eax register; all other cached target controls
do not map the PGPA space. We next discuss these attacks
in detail.
Jumping to fastio’s entry mov-to-cr3 instruction with
PPT’s address in the eax register
The guest could jump directly to the first mov-to-cr3 in-
struction (at fastio driver entry) without disabling interrupts.
Because the guest will only try to load the PPT into the
cr3 register, a VM exit will not occur (as the PPT address
is one of the CR3 target controls). This can potentially al-
low the guest to receive an external interrupt (as the inter-
rupts were not disabled), and execute its untrusted interrupt
handler while the PPT is operational. To prevent this attack,
we configure the virtualization hardware such that all exter-
nal interrupts cause VM exits. Because our experiments in-
volve high-throughput workloads, our fastio driver operates
in polling mode, and this extra interrupt handling cost does
not cause performance degradation. In Section 6, we discuss
a solution which allows the guest to directly handle hardware
interrupts (through Intel’s VT-d posted interrupts hardware
feature [16]) without VM exits, and yet ensures VM exits on
any interrupts received while the PPT was operational.
Thus, we can effectively ensure that the hypervisor gets
to interpose on any external interrupt received while the
PPT was operational. The hypervisor identifies the attack by
determining if the PPT was operational while the interrupt
was received, and thwarts it (potentially by terminating the
guest).
Jumping to fastio’s exit mov-to-cr3 instruction with
PPT’s address in the eax register
The guest could load the PPT’s address in a register and
branch to the second mov-to-cr3 instruction (at fastio
driver exit). This can enable the guest to execute untrusted
code inside fastio’s caller while the PPT is operational. To
thwart this attack, we further add a check at fastio’s exit (af-
ter the mov-to-cr3 instruction has executed) to confirm
that the current value of cr3 is not the PPT’s address. If it is,
the guest makes a hypercall to alert the hypervisor. Because
interrupts are not allowed while this code is executing, and
the PPT is guaranteed to map the fastio code pages correctly
(and only in one place), this ensures that such an attack gets
thwarted.
If the guest tries to jump anywhere in the middle of our
fastio driver, it does not pose a security risk, as that cannot
allow the guest to load the PPT or otherwise obtain the
capability to map the PGPA pages in its GVA space, other
than in ways discussed above.
4. The fastio driver
The fastio driver is our privileged code (TCB) can access
both guest’s data structures and the hypervisor’s privileged
state (including device state). The driver acts as a bridge
between the guest kernel and the device, and also allows
sharing of the device among multiple VMs and the host.
4.1 Setup
To simplify design, we use the same fastio driver, both
within the guests, and at the host. The host’s fastio driver
performs a few extra operations related to initialization of
the actual hardware device. At boot time, the host loads the
fastio driver, thus initializing the hardware device, and ini-
tializing a PPT for its own use. The host’s PPT maps the
host kernel (at their original virtual addresses) and the de-
vice pages at a fixed virtual address, say PDVA (privileged
device virtual address). After host’s PPT has been correctly
initialized, the host can now use the fastio driver to commu-
nicate to/from the device. For example, a transmit call from
the host involves switching to the PPT (within the host) and
transferring packets from the host kernel to the device. For
32-bit Linux, we use the top 1GB of the VA space for the
host kernel (0xc0000000-0xffffffff), and use 516 contigu-
ous pages starting at PDVA to map the device state. For our
prototype, we use PDVA = 4MB (it must not overlap with
the kernel’s address space). Of the 516 device pages in the
PPT, 512 pages are for device MMIO, and four pages are
for storing the device rings. Because we use the netmap API
for the device driver, whereby all rings and buffers are pre-
allocated by the kernel, the fastio driver is also responsible
for allocating the host’s netmap rings/buffers at load-time.
The initialization of the guest-side fastio driver is rel-
atively simple. The fastio driver authenticates itself to the
host, and allocates its netmap rings/buffers, and ensures that
the guest kernel can see an attached NIC. The guest’s fas-
tio driver also initializes its PPT, which contains mappings
for the device state. These mappings are made at the same
virtual addresses in all guest/host PPTs.
Besides device state, we also need mappings inside the
PPT for the buffers and rings of the host and other guests.
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This is required to allow sharing of the network device; one
guest should be able to receive packets for other guests/host
inside its fastio driver. We follow a convention, whereby
each guest (and host) is allocated a fixed amount of VA space
in the PPT, to map its network buffers. In our experiments,
a 16MB space for each guest is enough to map all its net-
work rings and buffers. These mappings start at a fixed ad-
dress, called ppt va start, which must be distinct from the
kernel addresses, and the addresses used to map the device
state. In our prototype implementation for 32-bit Linux, we
use ppt va start = 16MB. The device state is mapped
below ppt va start and the kernel is mapped starting
at address c0000000 (3GB). Thus, the VA space between
16MB and 3GB is available for mapping guest buffers and
rings. Assuming 16MB per guest, this allows us to map up
to 191 guests inside the PPT at the same time.
Each guest’s slab of VA space in the PPT is laid out
in a fixed format: the first few pages are dedicated to the
transmit and receive netmap rings, and all the other pages
contain the guest’s network buffers. A slot inside a netmap
ring contains pointers to the network buffers. Alongwith
the original buffer pointers (pointing to the guest kernel
addresses of the buffers), we also keep the corresponding
PPT pointers (pointing to the the same buffer but through the
PPT addresses) with each netmap ring slot. The PPT pointers
are initialized at fastio load time, as discussed below.
To distinguish between guests, we assign a fastio ID to
each guest/host. The host always has ID 0, while guests
are given IDs dynamically by the host, using bitmap-based
allocation. The netmap buffers of guest ID n, are accessible
at virtual address ppt va start + n * 16MB in the
PPT. Each guest slab (of 16MB) contains its netmap rings
and netmap buffers, laid out sequentially and contiguously.
Mapping between the slabs at ppt va start and the
corresponding physical memory need to be created dynam-
ically, as guests boot and shutdown. The mapping for the
host’s slab remains static, and gets initialized at PPT creation
time (alongwith the mappings for the device state). When
the fastio driver initializes within the guest, it allocates its
netmap rings and buffers, and makes a hypercall to inform
the host about the GPA addresses of these rings/buffers. The
host translates the GPA addresses to the corresponding host
physical addresses (HPA), and creates mappings appropri-
ately in the host’s PPT. Even if the buffers/rings were dis-
contiguous in the guest kernel, they are laid out sequentially
and contiguously in the PPT’s address space. Further, the
host walks through the netmap rings of the guest, and initial-
izes the PPT pointers inside the netmap ring slots. (Recall
that the PPT pointer for a guest buffer is the address at which
that buffer was mapped in the PPT in the guest’s slab). These
pointers can now be used by the host/other guests to access
this guest’s network buffers.
The PPT pointers stored in netmap ring slots are now
visible to the untrusted guest, and the guest could poten-
tially modify these pointers to try and confuse the fastio
driver. To avoid this attack, our fastio driver performs a base-
and-bounds check on the PPT pointer before de-referencing
it: (ppt pointer ≥ ppt va start + n * 16MB) and
(ppt pointer < ppt va start + (n + 1) * 16MB),
where n is the guest ID. This base-and-bounds check en-
sures that the PPT pointer lies within the guest’s PPT slab,
and so the guest cannot cause the fastio driver to incorrectly
read/write to memory outside its own address space.
Because we have multiple PPTs (one for each guest, and
one for the host), we may need to create these mappings
inside all PPTs. For the host, we create these mappings
immediately (at the time of fastio initialization hypercall).
For the guests, we create these mappings on-demand as
follows:
1. All guest PPTs are initialized such that they contain
GVA→GPA mappings from ppt va start (in GVA
space) to pgpa start (in GPA space) for a contiguous
block of size (MAX GUESTS * 16MB). pgpa start is a
PGPA address, i.e., an address in the guest’s physical ad-
dress space which is distinct from guest’s physical mem-
ory. We use pgpa start = 4GB + 16MB. (Recall that
the PGPA addresses in our implementation start at 4GB
and are used to map privileged device and hypervisor
state).
Thus, the mappings for guest ID n are accessible at ad-
dress pgpa start + n ∗ 16MB in the GPA space (for
all guests). Initially (when there are no guests), these
GPA addresses do not map to any host physical addresses
(HPA), i.e., the present bit in the corresponding EPT en-
tries is set to zero.
2. If a guest tries to access the netmap buffers of another
guest (or its own netmap buffers through the PPT),
an EPT violation may result if the corresponding GPA
address (in the pgpa start region) is currently un-
mapped. If this happens, the hypervisor handles the EPT
violation by creating the required GPA→HPA mapping
on demand, before resuming the guest.
4.2 Transmit/Receive Path
The fastio driver is trusted and works cooperatively with all
the other fastio drivers to transmit/receive network packets.
Mutual exclusion among different fastio drivers, is ensured
through a shared lock, which is also mapped using the PPT
in all guests/host.
On the transmit path, the driver flushes its own tx buffers
into the hardware ring On the receive path, the driver con-
sumes packets from the hardware ring, determines the des-
tination for each packet, and copies that packet into the rx
buffers of the appropriate guest/host. (Recall that using PPT,
guest ID, and PPT pointers, any guest/host can read the
rings/buffers of any other guest).
On the receive path, it is possible for a guest to behave
“selfishly” by never calling into the fastio driver, and still
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enjoying the “service” of other guests (as this guest’s packets
would still be received by other guests). Such an attack can
easily be prevented by maintaining statistics on the number
of fastio calls by each guest, and selectively dropping guest
packets on noticing selfish behaviour. Even if all guests are
selfish, the host would still be able to receive packets for all
of them and for itself.
While we use coarse-grained locking (one shared lock),
finer-grained synchronization could potentially increase
concurrency and perhaps performance. Further, in high-
contention scenarios, it may be better to select a “leader”
(or a few leaders) which will be responsible for switching
packets for all guests/host. Priorities could also be intro-
duced during acquisition of the shared lock, if needed.
4.3 Zero-Copy
Finally, we try and eliminate packet copies between the hard-
ware ring and the guest/host netmap rings. On the transmit
path, zero-copy is straight-forward. The fastio driver main-
tains a hash table, which contains a mapping between PPT
pointers (for guest’s network buffers) and their correspond-
ing HPA addresses. Insertions to this table happens at fastio
driver initialization time (when PPT pointers are determined
by the host during the hypercall). Further the host pins these
HPA addresses to memory, i.e. it ensures that its swapper
will never swap these addresses to disk.
During transmit, the fastio driver performs a fast hash
lookup to convert the PPT pointer of the network buffer (to
be transmitted) to its HPA address, and writes the computed
HPA address to the hardware ring, thus avoiding packet
copies. Using this mechanism, the hardware transmit ring
would now contain HPA pointers to buffers belonging to
different guests simultaneously.
On the receive path, zero-copy is similar. The guests/host
provide PPT pointers to empty buffers, through their netmap
rings. The host converts the PPT pointers to their HPA ad-
dresses and writes them to the hardware ring. Again, the
hardware receive ring would now contain HPA pointers to
buffers belonging to different guests simultaneously. The
hardware stores the received packets into these buffers.
There are two possibilities on the receive path: either the
packet-destination is the same as the owner of the buffer in
which it was received (match); or the packet-destination is
different from the buffer owner (mismatch).
Matches are easy to handle — we simply enqueue the
buffer pointer to the destination guest’s netmap receive ring,
so the guest can read the contents of the received packet.
Mismatches cannot be handled in this way — we cannot en-
queue the buffer pointer to the destination guest’s receive
ring, as the buffer does not belong to this guest. For mis-
matches, we allocate a fresh buffer from the destination
guest, and copy the packet contents into it before enqueue-
ing the newly allocated buffer into the destination guest’s
netmap receive ring.
There are two caveats to receive-side zero-copy. First, it is
now possible for one guest to snoop on the packets of another
guest (if the first guest’s buffer is used to receive the sec-
ond guest’s packet). This opens the possibility of one guest
launching a man-in-the-middle attack on another guest. Be-
cause modern network stacks are usually resilient to man-in-
the-middle attacks (through end-to-end encryption, for ex-
ample), this is usually not an issue. Second, the total num-
ber of buffers available to implement the receive stack is
now smaller: without zero-copy, there was an extra set of
buffers available exclusively to the hardware ring; with zero-
copy, the hardware ring relies on the buffers provided by the
guest/host netmap rings. The extra set of buffers available
to the hardware ring, allow the “double-buffering” effect,
whereby the hardware can receive packets on its own set of
buffers, while the user application can read already received
packets. To avoid this downside, we allocate netmap rings
with twice the number of buffers as the hardware ring. This
ensures that the double-buffering effect remains intact, even
in zero-copy mode.
Due to mismatches, the order of received buffers can be
different from the order in which buffers were allocated in
the ring. Because, zero-copy receive has slightly weaker
security guarantees, and requires more memory, we show
results both with and without rx-zerocopy.
5. Experiments
We conducted our experiments on a 4-core machine with
16GB RAM and an Intel X540-T2 10Gbps network adapter.
The machine was connected to a 10Gbps network switch. To
send/receive packets at the other end, we used another ma-
chine with an identical 10Gbps network adapter, also con-
nected to our 10Gbps network switch. We used 32-bit Linux
3.9.0 on our hosts and guest with PAE-paging mode. Our
guest was configured with two CPUs, and 1GB memory. For
experiments involving a single-core host, our guest was also
given only a single CPU. For our netmap-based experiments,
we used netmap’s pkt-gen utility to send/receive packets. For
experiments involving socket-based I/O, we used the netperf
utility.
Our fastio driver is based on the Linux ixgbe driver, with
the netmap ixgbe patch. The netmap’s patch defines two
functions, “txsync” and “rxsync”, which are used to trans-
mit/receive packets between the user’s netmap rings and
the hardware device respectively. The transfers between the
netmap rings and the hardware devices are performed in
batches, where the batch-size depends on the size of the
hardware ring. We used a hardware ring with 512 slots (de-
fault). To implement fastio, we modified the txsync and
rxsync function to switch to our PPT at entry, and switch
back to the original page table at exit. i.e., netmap’s txsync
and rxsync functions form the body of our fastio driver (Fig-
ure 1). We configured the driver to use polling, to avoid ex-
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traneous scheduling issues during our experiments [21]. Our
source code and raw data will be made publicly available.
Because the txsync and rxsync functions execute within
our trusted fastio driver while the PPT is operational, they
can access the rings of all guests/host, as well as the hard-
ware ring using the PPT addresses. We implemented our
zero-copy logic within the txsync and rxsync functions.
The same logic (for txsync and rxsync) would execute both
within the host and within all guests, as also discussed in
Section 4.2.
Table 1a presents our results for the network throughput
for a single guest on a multi-core host. The rows labeled
netmap- use the netmap API for user/kernel communi-
cation within the guest, while the rows labeled socket-
use the socket API. We show results using the virtio inter-
face without/with vhost support (labeled -virtio- and
-virtio-host- respectively). Further, we show results
for two different types of host-side switches, namely tap,
and netmap. For the netmap “switch”, the netmap ethernet
interface was directly exposed to the Qemu process (without
using the VALE switch that ships with netmap). The perfor-
mance with the VALE switch is inferior to the performance
without it, as it adds extra computation on the switching
path.
Without the netmap API within the guest, the through-
put is heavily CPU-bottlenecked at the guest’s user/kernel
interface. The netmap API on baremetal host, is able to
saturate the 10Gbps NIC even with 60B packets (14.8
Mpps). However using netmap with virtio incurs a large
performance penalty (2.3 Kpps for 60B packets). virtio-
vhost-tap improves the throughput marginally, while virtio-
netmap does not perform any better. We were unable to
setup virtio-netmap to receive packets; the transmit
side throughput in this configuration is only 154Kpps, and
we do not expect the receive throughput to be significantly
higher.
These CPU bottlenecks have also been previously re-
ported by ClickOS [20]. The ClickOS project addresses this
problem by overhauling Xen hypervisor’s I/O virtualization
subsystem. Just like netmap, ClickOS optimizations involve
memory-preallocation, batching, and fast switching, albeit at
the VM/hypervisor interface. Even with all these optimiza-
tions, ClickOS peaks at around 11 Mpps while transmitting
60B packets using a 512-slot device ring. On the receive
side, ClickOS peaks at around 6.2 Mpps for 60B packets
using a 512-slot device ring. (These figures have been taken
from [20]).
The row labeled -fastio shows the throughputs achieved
by our solution. Expectedly, our achieved throughputs are
very close to the throughputs achieved on bare-metal. Com-
pared to ClickOS, our transmit throughput is around 33%
better, and our receive throughput is around 115% bet-
ter, for the same hardware configuration. The row labeled
-fastio-no-rzc shows throughput without our zero-
Number of tx/rx 1 2 3 4
tx-60B 14704 14753 14776 14860
tx-1500B 815 820 820 820
rx-60B 13292 11712 9800 8311
rx-1500B 816 820 820 820
Table 2: Transmit and receive performance for multiple
VMs on a 10Gbps NIC (Kpps).
copy optimization on the receive side; because the cost of
packet-copies is not significant on the I/O path, the through-
puts are largely similar to -fastio.
Table 1b presents the throughput results for a unipro-
cessor host and guest. Our solution remains unaffected by
the scarcity of CPUs, while virtio and virtio-vhost observe
(sometimes significant) performance penalties.
Table 2 shows the total throughput with multiple trans-
mitters and receivers for 60B/1500B packets. For multiple
tx/rx agents (> 1), one of the agents is the host and the rest
are VMs. We show results for up to four tx/rx agents, as our
test machine had four CPU cores. The transmit-side through-
put remains largely unaffected with increasing number of
transmitters; moreover, the bandwidth is largely fairly allo-
cated among the transmitters. On the receive-side, we no-
tice throughput degradation for small packets with increas-
ing number of agents; this degradation is largely due to pack-
ets dropped while trying to enqueue them to the receive-side
rings of other agents. For a single receiver, packet drops can-
not not happen, as the receiving agent simply returns to its
userspace (which consumes the packet) on observing a full
ring. However, if one agent tries to enqueue a packet to a
full ring of another receiver, the packet gets dropped (wasted
work). The probability of packet drops increases with in-
creasing number of receivers. The probability is smaller for
larger packets, as the CPU has to do less work — thus we do
not see the effect of dropped packets for 1500B-sized trans-
fers.
Next, we discuss the maximum achievable throughput
of our fastio packet switch, assuming both the transmitter
and receiver are running as VMs (without NIC involve-
ment). For this experiment, we implemented a shared soft-
ware ring which replaced our hardware ring. The transmit-
ters enqueued to this software ring, while the receivers de-
queued from it. For this experiment, the transmit-side oper-
ation involved copying packets (always) from netmap rings
to the shared software ring; on the receive-side, we show
results with and without the zero-copy optimization. Table 3
presents throughput results for one-transmitter/one-receiver
(tx1-rx1), one-transmitter/three-receivers (tx1-rx3), three-
transmitters/one-receiver (tx3-rx1), and two-transmitters/one-
receiver (tx2-rx2). The maximum achievable throughput
with receive-side zero-copy enabled, is around 30 Mpps
for small packets, and 10.9 Mpps for large packets; with-
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Config fastio fastio-no-rzc
pktsize 60B 1500B 60B 1500B
tx1-rx1 30.43 10.93 22.59 7.84
tx1-rx3 12.08 6.18 11.37 5.21
tx3-rx1 27.19 8.02 20.06 6.20
tx2-rx2 15.61 7.50 13.80 5.81
Table 3: Total throughput for software-only switching with-
out NIC involvement (Mpps).
out zero-copy, the throughputs decreases to 22.6 and 7.8
Mpps respectively. In all these cases, the achieved through-
puts are well above the line-rates supported by current NICs.
With increasing number of receivers, packets start getting
dropped resulting in lower overall throughput. With an in-
creasing number of transmitters (tx3-rx1), the throughput
drops marginally, presumably due to lock contention. VALE,
another netmap-based software switch, reports throughputs
of around 3.4 Mpps (tx) and 2.5 Mpps (rx) while running
KVM-based virtual machines [26]. While exact/fair compar-
isons with VALE are not possible (as our switch is perhaps
lacking in many features provided by VALE), the perfor-
mance improvements provided by our switch due to in-guest
switching are clearly visible. In contrast, VALE requires
host-side involvement.
Finally, we discuss the runtime overheads of DBOS.
DBOS overheads are related to VM exits caused due to
guest’s execution of the mov-to-cr3 opcode (which is
patched by us to the int3 opcode), and VM exits due to
write-accesses to the page-table pages (which are write-
protected by us using the EPT). For all our experiments
involving pkt-gen and the Linux kernel, we encountered
zero overhead due to DBOS. This is expected because only a
few page-table switches occur during pkt-gen execution,
and almost no writes happen to the page-table pages. How-
ever, it is possible for a VM to be running other programs
simultaneously with pkt-gen; to characterize these over-
heads, we run some CPU-intensive programs (taken from
SPEC CPUInt2000 [13]) and present runtime overheads,
alongwith the statistics collected for VM exits. The over-
heads range between -2% and 34%; the majority of this over-
head is due to writes to page-table pages by the guest kernel,
presumably to implement LRU page-replacement algorithm.
We also show results for the forkwait microbenchmark
[1] which forks 40,000 processes and waits for each of them
to exit in turn. Given that the forkwait benchmark creates
and destroys a large number of page tables, the resulting
DBOS overhead is significant (18.74x). After running all
these benchmarks, 12 kernel pages contained at least one
int3 patch. All these patches were in the guest’s kernel,
and were due to mov-to-cr3 instructions. We also found
193 instances where the suffix of the 2.5-byte sequence oc-
curred at the top of an executable page in the guest. Of these,
original DBOS
program time (s) slowdown ptable-exits cr3-exits
gcc 35.6 1.34 910509 2436
perlbmk 6.2 1.13 54515 619
gap 46.7 1.03 113588 1593
bzip2 103.8 1.05 420005 3783
twolf 119.1 1.00 22330 3906
gzip 94.4 1.08 560305 3820
vpr 79.2 0.98 120257 2659
mcf 40.1 1.02 56913 1372
crafty 45.3 1.01 14418 1545
forkwait 8.9 18.74 10924572 166187
Table 4: DBOS overheads
39 occurred in kernel’s executable pages and 154 occurred
in user’s executable pages. Similarly, we found 69 instances
where the prefix of the 2.5-byte sequence occurred at the
bottom of an executable page in the guest (60 user, 9 ker-
nel).
6. Discussion
Our performance experiments and our discussion on security
demonstrates the utility of DBOS as a security technique.
We use several x86 mechanisms to achieve a practical imple-
mentation of DBOS, namely, EPT-based read/write/execute
page-protection, the length of the mov-to-cr3 instruction
opcode, support for CR3 target controls, ability to configure
the virtualization hardware to cause VM exits on certain in-
structions, to name a few. For example, if the length of the
mov-to-cr3 opcode was smaller (e.g., one byte instead of
the 2.5 bytes), the number of patch-sites and resulting exits
would have been greater. Similarly, security would not have
been possible without support for CR3 target controls.
As we discuss in Section 3.1, we configure the virtual-
ization hardware to cause a VM-exit on every interrupt, and
we discussed why we need this capability to ensure security
(Section 3.1). For interrupt-intensive workloads, this may be
a severe performance penalty [10]. Recent support for x86
VT-d posted interrupts allow the guest to directly receive in-
terrupts without requiring VM exits. Even if the guest wants
to use VT-d posted interrupts, we could still ensure that any
interrupt received within the TCB causes a VM exit by en-
suring that the virtual addresses containing the interrupt-
descriptor-table (IDT) are unmapped in our PPT. Typically,
the kernel initializes the IDT in the beginning and stores its
virtual address in the IDTR using the lidt instruction. The
hypervisor can interpose on the execution of the lidt in-
struction (by requiring a VM exit), and record the address of
the IDT. Thereafter, it can ensure that the virtual addresses
corresponding to the IDT addresses in the PPT are mapped
to a shadow IDT [10]. All entries in our shadow IDT would
have their present-bit set to 0, causing a not-present excep-
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tion an an interrupt. Additionally, the host is configured to
force a VM exit whenever a not-present exception occurs.
Through this, the hypervisor would get to interpose on any
interrupt received during TCB execution.
Because we ensure that all mov-to-cr3 instruction ex-
ecutions within the guest cause VM exits, this can cause
overhead for applications that involve significant context-
switching, as also seen in our experiments. One could poten-
tially optimize this further by using in-place binary patching
to replace all mov-to-cr3 instructions with a call to a spe-
cial trusted function (another TCB), that allows loading the
cr3 without requiring a VM exit. This would involve caching
the most-frequently-used cr3 values in the CR3 target con-
trols. We leave this optimization for future work.
The choice of the opcode to subtract is also interesting;
on the x86 architecture, we identified three different possible
ways of accomplishing security through opcode subtraction.
We have discussed the first one involving subtraction of the
mov-to-cr3 opcode in this paper. The other two involve
subtracting either the lgdt opcode, or the mov-to-cr4
opcode. In both these cases, the subtracted opcode is used at
entry and exit of the fastio driver. Of all the three choices,
the mov-to-cr3 opcode incurs the least overhead on the
I/O path.
Finally, we discuss guest fidelity. In general, DBOS does
not change guest behaviour in any way (apart from poten-
tially slowing it down). The only exception is that we rely
on the identification of instruction boundaries; if instruction
boundaries are incorrectly determined, or they can change
dynamically, DBOS can cause the guest’s logical behaviour
to change. As we show in our experiments for Linux, this
is usually not an issue. While this work is about implement-
ing DBOS on existing OS/programs, it should be possible to
make the compiler DBOS-aware, so that it prevents emission
of certain byte sequences.
7. Related Work
There are two categories of related work for this paper:
one involving network I/O optimization and virtualization,
and the other involving software-based security techniques
such as dynamic binary translation, proof-carrying code, and
typed-assembly language.
Network I/O Optimization and Virtualization
Routebricks [6] worked on implementing fast software
routers by scaling them on a number of servers. PFQ [3],
PF RING [5], Intel DPDK [7], and netmap [25] are all ap-
proaches involving mapping NIC buffers into user address
space.
As already discussed, ClickOS [20] suggests a complete
overhaul of the Xen hypervisor’s network interface, which
increases the effective bandwidth between the guest OS and
the hardware NIC. Other work on improving hypervisor net-
working performance [4, 24, 27, 28] suggest similar op-
timizations; [12, 30] discuss scheduling optimizations for
good networking throughput. Efforts involving vhost-like
optimizations for Open vswitch [23, 24] are also interest-
ing. All these efforts involve optimizing either the guest-side
stack, or the host-side stack, or the guest/host virtualization
interface. In comparison, our approach completely obviates
the host-side stack, and provides direct NIC access to the
guest, resulting in significantly higher throughputs and lower
latencies.
Software Techniques for Security
The closest competing technique to DBOS, is perhaps dy-
namic binary translation (DBT). Unlike DBOS, DBT incurs
large overheads for indirect jumps and interrupts/exceptions
[1, 8]. BTKernel [18] optimizes DBT for interrupts/exceptions
and indirect branches; however, BTKernel cannot provide
the security guarantees required for our application. For ex-
ample, BTKernel’s approach of leaving code-cache address
on return stacks, and jumping directly to them can be used to
launch a security attack in our case. DBOS is a low-overhead
mechanism for ensuring security, and usually results in much
lower overheads than DBT for similar security guarantees.
Conversely, DBOS is not as powerful as DBT, and cannot be
used for several other DBT applications.
DBOS is similar to verification techniques such as proof-
carrying code (PCC) [22] and typed-assembly language
(TAL) [11], in that, both techniques involve analyzing the
code at load time to ascertain safety. However, unlike PCC
and TAL, our analysis is much simpler — we only check for
the occurrence of a certain pattern (grep) in the executable
address space. In contrast, PCC and TAL require detailed
reasoning about semantics of individual instructions, and
control flow. While PCC and TAL have been successfully
used to ascertain safety for relatively small programs, as-
certaining safety against a full guest operating system still
remains an open problem. Also, verification techniques sel-
dom worry about instruction boundaries, and the potential
of being able to jump in the middle of an instruction. Our
current method for driver certification involves digital sig-
natures; it remains to be seen if methods like proof-carrying
code may be used instead. A PCC-based certifier would need
to certify that the fastio driver behaves as expected, and does
not allow PPT access to be leaked to the untrusted guest.
8. Conclusions
We present a novel security mechanism, DBOS, and show its
successful application for I/O virtualization. Using DBOS,
we are able to expose the privileged hypervisor/device state
to the guest without security risks. Our trusted guest-side
driver can access this privileged state to perform fast I/O
and switching. We show significant improvements over the
state-of-the-art device virtualization solutions, and software
switches.
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